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OPERATION FORAGER: Air Power in the Campaign for Saipan
Par Lieutenant Commander Mark D Tate USN. 2014
This study is an examination of historical data to determine the effectiveness of air power in supporting operations during the…
battle for Saipan during June and July 1944. The battle was fought during a critical phase of World War II, over an island whose strategic significance would become manifest during the war's closing months. The Japanese correctly believed that losing Saipan would mean the beginning of the end for the Empire.The study determines that the role of air power was critical in protecting the amphibious force, defeating the Japanese fleet, decimating land-based Japanese air forces, and supporting the troops on the ground. Air power at Saipan created an environment which made an American victory inevitable.The study examines the assets available and their effectiveness in various types of air support employed at Saipan, and looks at joint air employment. It concludes that anti-air combat and airfield interdiction were highly successful, while fleet action and close air support were moderately successful. It examines factors involved and the results produced. It concludes that joint operations were conducted, but that these were operations of coexistence rather than real coordination.Admiral Raymond A. Spruance: Lessons In Adaptation From The Pacific
Par LCDR Jeffrey Sturm USN. 2014
The combination of fiscal constraints, expanding technology and globalization is causing the nature of warfare to rapidly evolve. The wars…
of tomorrow will not look like today's war. The ability to adapt to changing warfare environments hinges on a leader's ability to think broadly and view the operation through the lens of the entire conflict. This paper analyzes how Admiral Raymond A. Spruance prepared for the challenge of conducting amphibious assaults in the Central Pacific during World War II. Further, the paper uses Admiral Spruance's development as an operational thinker as a case study for today's leaders to prepare for the challenge of adapting to future operational environments. Admiral Spruance's operational education, operational training and experiential base is discussed and recommendations are provided to help today's leaders prepare for tomorrow's battles.The Soviet Air Force And Strategic Bombing
Par Major Philip A. Stemple. 2014
It is the purpose of this project to show why the Soviet Air Force did not embrace the revolutionary Douhetian…
concept of strategic bombing as did other world powers during the 1920's, 30's and World War II. It is also to explain that in addition to technological shortcomings, there was a combination of theoretical and doctrinal reasons, taken to rigidity, that was responsible for this. Moreover, to show that when the revolution in military affairs (RMA) of nuclear weapons occurred strategic bombing was adopted. Additionally, that even as strategic bombing became fundamental to Soviet strategic doctrine during the Cold War, it was not at the exclusion of a more traditional Red Air Force role.The Twelfth US Air Force: Tactical And Operational Innovations In The Mediterranean Theater Of Operations, 1943-1944
Par Major Matthew G St Clair USMC. 2014
This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to…
1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The requirements of the coalition air campaign in the Mediterranean theater provided significant challenges to the leadership of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). Prewar Army Air Corps doctrine focused on strategic bombing and aerial interdiction. Air- men lacked a well thought-out tactical support doctrine and had no doctrine for supporting amphibious operations. The mission of the AAF in the North African and Italian campaigns was the winning of air superiority. The Twelfth Air Force had to adopt new tactics and operational techniques to support the Allied landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy, against the formidable German Luftwaffe.The Mediterranean theater was the first theater to encounter the use of precision-guided munitions in the form of radio-controlled glide bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe. The Mediterranean theater was designated a secondary theater of war, resulting in the Twelfth Air Force operating with inadequate resources, as aircraft and crews were periodically reassigned to units supporting the Combined Bomber Offensive in the European theater of operations. While supporting the Mediterranean theater, the Twelfth Air Force operated alongside the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and was routinely tasked with supporting operations of both the US Fifth and British Eighth Armies. This provided significant command, control, and communication (C3) problems that had to be addressed to optimize the effectiveness of Allied airpower.Setting Sun: A Critical Analysis Of Japan’s Employment Of Naval Airpower In The Battle Of The Coral Sea
Par LCDR Arno J Sist USN. 2014
The Battle of the Coral Sea, the first naval engagement fought exclusively between Naval Air forces, was a pivotal battle…
of the war in the Pacific. Although considered a Japanese tactical victory, it was the beginning of the end of Japan's war effort. This analysis examines this decisive battle from the Japanese perspective. The critical analysis will include a summary of the reasons why the battle unfolded as it did, and will draw conclusions as to how the Japanese may have been more successful both strategically and tactically in this key battle of World War II.I Am a Star: Child of the Holocaust
Par Inge Auerbacher. 1993
The Nazis tried to destroy Inge's life--but they could not break her spirit.Inge Auerbacher's childhood was as happy and peaceful…
as any other German child's--until 1942. By then, the Nazis were in power, and because Inge's family was Jewish, she and her parents were sent to a concentration camp in Czechoslovakia. The Auerbachers defied death for three years, and were finally freed in 1945. In her own words, Inge Auerbacher tells her family's harrowing story--and how they carried with them ever after the strength and courage of will that allowed them to survive.Kasserine: The Myth and Its Warning for Airland Battle Operations
Par Lt -Col Alan M Russo. 2014
The paper traces the history of air and ground forces during the February 1943 battle of the Kasserine Pass. It…
briefly outlines the state of training of the Army and its Air Corps and their procedures for battle coordination. The report highlights the antagonisms between air and ground advocates--each attempting to wrest control of air-ground coordination responsibilities--and shows that these antagonisms coupled with the air advocates' desire for self-determination of air power led to centralized control of tactical air power under the guise of lessons learned in battle at Kasserine.The paper shows that the close coordination and affiliation developed between air and land forces in World War II apparently has dissipated, and that this dissipation may cause a lack of effective air support to ground forces fighting on the modern battlefield. It suggests that the Air Force is not sufficiently concerned with how, and to what effect its support of the Army will be conducted.Forcible Entry And The German Invasion Of Norway, 1940
Par Major Michael W. Richardson. 2014
The air-sea-land forcible entry of Norway in 1940 utilized German operational innovation and boldness to secure victory. The Germans clearly…
met, and understood, the conditions that were necessary to achieve victory. The central research question of this thesis is: What lessons concerning setting the conditions for present day forcible entry operations can be gleaned from the successful German invasion of Norway in 1940? Forcible entry is the introduction of an aggregation of military personnel, weapons systems, vehicles, and necessary support, or a combination thereof, embarked for the purpose of gaining access through land, air, or amphibious operations into an objective area against resistance. This aggregation of military force attempts to set conditions that cripple the enemy's ability to react decisively to, or interfere with, the forcible entry operation. The German emphasis on surprise and speed, an effective psychological campaign, and combined operations under a unified command in the invasion of Norway rendered the Norwegian and Allied intervention forces (including the Royal Navy which dominated the seas in the area) incapable of seriously interfering with the German forcible entry.Waking The Sleeping Giant At Pearl Harbor: A Case For Intelligence And Operations Fusion
Par Major Blanca Reyes. 2014
Despite the fact that for many years the United States conducted detailed planning the Japanese were still able to conduct…
a successful attack at Pearl Harbor. The 1907 war scare with Japan led to the initiation in America of war planning against the threat of Japanese aggression, and the establishment of a standing American capability at the Army War College, where each year students critically analyzed and recommended updates to standing defense plans. Based on these strategic plans, the Hawaiian Department implemented and developed Joint defense plans for Oahu.Historians have shown that the United States military possessed the intelligence to indicate an impending attack on Pearl Harbor. However, the ability to respond to the attack depended on two things: early warning, and effective defense planning. In 1941, radar--the primary means of early warning--remained a new technology. Radar proved to be effective and correctly detected the incoming attack but lacked the ability to discriminate between friendly or enemy aircraft. This monograph has particular significance given today's concern in America regarding homeland defense, since the lessons learned from analyzing the cause of the successful Pearl Harbor attack will offer insight to planners working on modern-day concerns like potential terrorist attacks against the United States involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. By determining whether poor planning or lack of early warning and response capability led to the tragedy of Pearl Harbor, this research will contribute to modern efforts to prepare for homeland defense.Concepts Of Information Warfare In Practice: General George S. Patton And The Third Army Information Service, Aug.-Dec., 1944
Par Lt.-Col. Dean A. Nowowiejski. 2014
This monograph looks for historical examples of information warfare in order to gain insight into its current practice. It first…
describes key elements of the concept of information operations, particularly as they relate to battle command. It then explores how George S. Patton and his Third Army Information Service demonstrated those ideas, and how their example offers direction for current developments in information warfare.Key sources used in research included emerging doctrinal literature on information warfare, biographical information on the professional development and command qualities of Patton, and after action reports of the Third Army and 6th Cavalry Group, the unit that constituted the Army Information Service.This monograph found that Patton aggressively sought information advantage as a battle commander, and that he demonstrated the key qualities of vision and intuition. The Third Army Information Service developed a relevant common picture of the battlefield by the expanding the instrument of directed liaison.What needs emphasis in current concept of information warfare is the improving the ability of commanders and staffs to process information. We must reemphasize the human dimensions of information operations through refined professional development.Air Power in Three Wars: World War II, Korea, Vietnam [Illustrated Edition]
Par General William W Momyer USAF. 2014
[Includes over 130 illustrations and maps]This insightful work documents the thoughts and perspectives of a general with 35 years of…
history with the U.S. Air Force - General William W. Momyer. The manuscript discusses his years as a senior commander of the Air Force - strategy, command and control counter air operations, interdiction, and close air support. His perspectives cover World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.Rommel, Operational Art And The Battle Of El Alamein
Par Cmdr Mark A. Machin USN. 2014
Field Marshal Rommel's North African Campaign demonstrates many of the limitations and restricting factors of modern warfare. Examining the Axis…
Alliance preparation, implementation and sustainment of its operations provides insight applicable to the warfare commander of today. Relevancy is obtained through analysis of the Axis coalition command and control structure, tactical battle operations, strategic strategy, weapon technology, use of intelligence and logistical support network. Rommel's successful offensive through Libya and Egypt was ended at the Battle of El Alamein due to the critical influence of these factors. His exploits demonstrate excellence of battlefield tactics at the expense of strategic strategy and logistical sustainment.The Deeds Of Valiant Men: A Study In Leadership. The Marauders In North Burma, 1944
Par LTC Henry L. Kinnison IV. 2014
This paper is intended to examine key aspects of senior leadership in the execution of the North Burma Campaign of…
1944 by the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). The paper addresses the formation and training of the unit, also known as Merrill's Marauders. It also addresses the three major missions performed by the Marauders to include the seizing of the Myitkyina airstrip. In particular, the paper considers the leadership of Generals Stilwell and Merrill during the campaign and examines new evidence concerning their performance.Eichelberger In Mindanao: Leadership In Joint Operations
Par LTC Dan K McNeill. 2014
General Robert L. Eichelberger was an extraordinary and brilliant leader. He was a selfless man who loyally and diligently served…
an egocentric task maker in General Douglas MacArthur. Eichelberger was the American version of the British Field Marshal William Slim of Burma fame. In a six-month period in World War II, Eichelberger's Eighth US Army made 52 amphibious landings in the Southwest Pacific Theater. In each of those operations, Eichelberger skillfully used US and Allied ground troops, naval forces, and aircraft. While his Army was normally assigned a supporting or mopping-up role, the Mindanao campaign was solely Eichelberger's. The purpose behind this study is to explore Eichelberger's leadership in the joint operations on, Mindanao Island in the Philippines.The Soviet Airborne Experience [Illustrated Edition]
Par Colonel David M Glantz. 2014
[Includes 36 maps and 10 tables]Deep battle, a major element in both U.S. and Soviet doctrine, is a tenet that…
emphasizes destroying, suppressing, or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the line of contact, but throughout the depth of the battlefield. Airborne forces are a primary instrument to accomplish this type of operation. While the exploits of German, British, and American paratroops since 1940 are well known to most professional soldiers, the equivalent experience of the Soviet Union has been largely ignored--except in the Soviet Union. There, the Red Army's airborne operations have become the focus of many recent studies by military theorists.Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz has done much to remedy this gap in our historical literature. The Soviet Airborne Experience examines the experiences of the Red Army in World War II and traces Soviet airborne theory and practice both before and since the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. Airborne warfare emerges as an essential part of the high-speed offensive operations planned by Soviet commanders.Because Lieutenant Colonel Glantz examines airborne operations within the larger context of Soviet unconventional warfare, the implications of this study reach beyond one specialized form of maneuver. This study, in demonstrating the ability of Russian airborne and partisan forces to survive and fight behind German lines for months at a time, provides us with an instructive example of how Soviet special operations troops probably plan to operate in future wars. The Soviet Airborne Experience is an important reference for anyone concerned with planning and conducting operations.August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive In Manchuria [Illustrated Edition]
Par Colonel David M Glantz. 2014
[Includes 15 tables, 1 tables, 26 maps]In August 1945, only three months after the rumble of gunfire had subsided in…
Europe, Soviet armies launched massive attacks on Japanese forces in Manchuria. In a lightning campaign that lasted but ten days, Soviet forces ruptured Japanese defenses on a 4,000-kilometer front, paralyzed Japanese command and control, and plunged through 450 kilometers of forbidding terrain into the heartland of Manchuria. Effective Soviet cover and deception masked the scale of offensive preparations and produced strategic surprise. Imaginative tailoring of units to terrain, flexible combat formations, and bold maneuvers by armor-heavy, task-organized forward detachments and mobile groups produced operational and tactical surprise and, ultimately, rapid and total Soviet victory.For the Soviet Army, the Manchurian offensive was a true postgraduate combat exercise. The Soviets had to display all the operational and tactical techniques they had learned in four years of bitter fighting in the west. Though the offensive culminated an education, it also emerged as a clear case study of how a nation successfully begins a war in a race against the clock arid not only against an enemy, but also against hindering terrain.Soviet military historians and theorists have recently focused on the Manchurian offensive, a theater case study characterized by deep mobile operations on a broad front designed to pre-empt and overcome defenses. Because these characteristics appear relevant to current theater operations, the Soviets study the more prominent operational and tactical techniques used in Manchuria in 1945. What is of obvious interest to the Soviet military professional should be of interest to the U.S. officer as well.August Storm: Soviet Tactical And Operational Combat In Manchuria, 1945 [Illustrated Edition]
Par Colonel David M Glantz. 2014
[Includes 19 tables, 7 figures, 41 maps]To be successful, a strategic military operation requires careful planning and meticulous execution. History…
applauds the commander who orchestrates the operation, and major subordinate commanders share in the glory. In reality, however, commanders and soldiers at the operational and tactical levels play an even more critical role in achieving battlefield success. History often accords them little attention.Practitioners of war must study war at all levels. An understanding of the strategic aspects of military operations is essential in order to provide a context for a more detailed and equally critical understanding of precise operational and tactical techniques. Few officers practice war at the strategic level. The majority wrestle with the myriad of problems associated with implementing those strategic plans.Leavenworth Paper no. 8. through the medium of detailed case studies, examines the operational and tactical aspects of a major strategic operation--the Soviet offensive m Manchuria in 1945. The case studies, which involve army, corps, division, regimental, and battalion operations, focus on the many problems commanders and soldiers at that level face. Constrained by time, a desperate enemy, rugged terrain, and severe climatic conditions--the realities of war-- Soviet commanders devised find implemented techniques that produced victory. This paper highlights those techniques in the knowledge that Soviet theorists have likewise studied them in detail, both historically and in a contemporary context.The Operational Implications Of Deception At The Battle Of Kursk
Par Major James E. Elder. 2014
This monograph analyzes the use of deception by the Germans and Soviets in the battle of Kursk. It uses a…
paradigm consisting of: commander's aim, intelligence, centralized control, synchronization and operations security to determine why Soviet deception succeeded and German deception failed. The analysis provides insights into the use of operational deception on the modern battlefield.The conclusions of this monograph suggest that: operational deception is not a separate deception activity; that it can be used in the offense or defense; that it can be a viable combat multiplier today and that deception is an acquired Skill. The study monograph shows that operational deception must organize and control the deception efforts at the tactical level and that simple battlefield deception techniques can produce an operational effect.The monograph shows the critical role commanders have in establishing an appropriate course of action that sets the stage for deception. The selected course of action must provide a picture of duplicity to the enemy commander by presenting two possible objectives. This concept of alternative objectives allows the deception activity to flow naturally from the COA and confuse the enemy.The monograph recommends incorporation of deception into the officer corps professional development through professional reading programs in schools and practical application at the National Training Center. Combat Maneuver Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and the Battle Command Training Program. It also recommends that the Army develop and field sufficient communications and non-communications' devices to allow Army Groups to simulate a U.S. Corps.The XIV Corps Battle for Manila; February 1945
Par Captain Kevin T. McEnery. 2014
This study is a historical analysis of the February 1945 battle to liberate Manila. It focuses on the large unit…
urban combat operations of the U.S. Amy XIV Corps. The XIV Corps attack was part of the larger Allied campaign to liberate Luzon in the Philippines. Manila was an important political and military objective. This month long battle was the only time in the Second World War that U.S. forces fought the Japanese inside a major city. It represented a dramatic departure from the earlier island campaigns of the Pacific Theater.The study evaluates the relationship between the strategic and operational importance of modern major cities and U.S. tactical doctrine for seizing a defended city. The analysis includes U.S. Army World War II large unit doctrine for offensive urban combat, the circumstances that determined the city of Manila would become a battlefield, and the adaptation of doctrine by XIV Corps in Manila. From this historical analysis, we can determine planning and operational considerations for likely corps and division level urban combat today.Intelligence And Surprise: The Battle Of Midway
Par LCMR Stephanie A Markam USN. 2014
Intelligence is a key element in the military strategy of surprise. It is perplexing to many that in today's high…
technology environment that intelligence cannot prevent surprises from happening. The very nature of the intelligence, no matter how much or how sophisticated it is, will still permit one adversary to surprise another. It is crucial that the operational commander have a clear understanding of the process of the production of intelligence, the uses of intelligence and how it can affect the strategy of surprise. The dramatic success of the Battle of Midway, coming so closely on the heels of the shocking disaster at Pearl Harbor, demonstrated that Admiral Nimitz gained an appreciation for the value of intelligence. I will examine intelligence and the strategy of surprise in general terms and shows how the battle of Midway was influenced by them. Finally, I want to point out that though today's operations may be more sophisticated than those of World War II, there are plenty of critical concerns to consider today with regard to intelligence and surprise at the operational level.